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It is as if economics has never really transcended the experiences of 
its childhood, when Newtonian physics was the only science worth 
imitating and celestial mechanics its most notable achievement
Nelson and Winter, 1985
Introduction
While many of the practices of economists remain an easy target for criticism 
by philosophers and postmodern social scientists, it is not certain whether 
economists are entirely to blame for their austere ways. In fact, if we look 
carefully at the history of economics, much of the stringency that plagues the 
neoclassical approach can be traced back to logical positivism and the sci-
entism of early Anglo-American, ‘analytic’ philosophy. Having attended the 
2013 INEM conference (International Network for Economic Method) hosted 
by the Erasmus Institute for Philosophy & Economics, I can safely say that 
I am not alone in wondering what the future holds for the discipline. To 
paraphrase Don Ross, Dean of the Faculty of Commerce at the University of 
Cape Town and the now chairman of the INEM organization, the mere fact 
that economists within the debate are unaware of what the actual problems 
in their methodology are conveys that the discipline itself is in trouble1.
My goal is to examine the development of what has become known as 
‘Samuelsonian economics’. Samuelsonianism (coined by Deirdre McCloskey 
(2002)) can be used to refer to what is commonly called the ‘neoclassical’ or 
‘mainstream’ approach to economic theorizing. In this paper I will argue that 
it is this attitude toward economics that is hindered by a rather contracted 
methodology, one which overprivileges quantitative analysis and likewise 
eschews alternative heterodox approaches. However, I will show that (to the 
benefit of economists) the contemporary economic discourse – the rhetoric 
of quantification – is itself resultant of a broader intellectual movement, 
what can be called modernism. By considering the ways that other ‘modern’ 
disciplines have developed, I argue that this method of discourse, with which 
economists came to preeminence, is reminiscent of an obsolete paradigm2.
Methodology and Discourse
How are we to understand economics? Prior to the outbreak of logical 
positivism, one could not discern where philosophy began and economics 
ended3. In reading Smith, Hume, or Marx, the notion of political economy 
was qualitative; it was continuous with moral theory and metaphysical belief. 
This contrasts with the discipline as it is conceived today, as orthogonal to 
morality and many of the quirks of human nature. Yet it is no less difficult 
now to classify economics among the canon of the sciences. Although the 
theoretical issues are many and varied, the scope of interest for philosophers 
of economics is bifurcated among two general lines: one branch of inquiry 
asks whether economics can (and should be) treated as a ‘positive’ science, 
similar to the natural sciences like physics and chemistry – ‘positive’ mean-
ing that science is strictly concerned with fact-gathering and measurement 
and not with evaluating values or beliefs. In this regard Paul Samuelson 
(1947/1983: 219) notably stated that ‘the scientist does not consider it any 
part of his task to deduce or verify (except on the anthropological level) the 
value judgments whose implications he grinds out’. Accordingly, positive 
sciences adhere to immutable laws which are unfalsifiable and (more impor-
tantly) are immune to the emotional disturbances of human judgment4. 
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 Another branch of inquiry asks whether economists ought to take into 
consideration the moral and ethical implications of their assumptions and 
concomitant theories. For instance, what is the effect that markets have 
upon individuals’ personal autonomy and perception of freedom? Can 
some markets be noxious? What about the kind of metrics that econo-
mists employ – do indices such as Gross Domestic Product/Gross National 
Product obscure our conception of national improvement and by extension 
human development? How do we reconcile high national production with 
low standards of living? Though such inquiries far from exhaust the many 
issues that are demanding of attention here; the punchline is that, until very 
recently, such questions were not taken into consideration by economists 
– or at least not given the due consideration that the majority of non-
economists believed they required. Within the discipline, these inquiries 
were left to the marginalized heterodox cousins of mainstream economists. 
It is somewhat ironic then that economists have the intellectual monopoly 
over the economy that they do. Despite the sophistication of their mathemat-
ics and dogged use of regression analyses, economists cannot say much about 
the economy that is not itself implicit in the parameters and assumptions 
which they impose. That is to say, when speaking about the economy, econo-
mists employ a system of rhetoric that is self-referential: it does not explain 
phenomena the way that physics or chemistry explain phenomena. That is 
not to say that supply and demand curves, national accounting identities or 
decision axioms are not demonstrative of extant phenomena; but we must 
realize that these methods are explanatorily ideal: while these tools are useful 
insofar as the framework which employs them actually maps the topography 
of that thing we call the ‘economy’ – and hence has some use in real markets 
and real institutions – economists tend to forget that such heuristics are ide-
alizations, not a priori truths5. If economists conceive of the economy by the 
very set of concepts that they presume it to be constitutive of, then this seems 
question-begging. As Deirdre McCloskey (1999: 426) quips, ‘It ain’t science. 
It’s just logic. It connects assumption A with conclusions C’. 
Even within the economics community there is little consensus as to 
how the economy should be managed (or even how it ought to be con-
ceived!). Consider Paul Krugman’s recent controversial New York Times 
article (2009, September 2nd): the exegesis of the housing market crash 
is presented as a subtly scathing critique of Chicago-style, or what he calls 
‘Freshwater’, economic methods6. He states that ‘the economics profes-
sion went astray because economists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in 
impressive-looking mathematics, for truth. . . Economics, as a field, got 
in trouble because economists were seduced by the vision of a perfect, 
frictionless market system.’ However, not even Krugman, an insider and 
conspicuously influential economist, had carte blanche to make these criti-
cisms. David Colander (2011) has since censured Krugman’s account of 
the crisis and his caricature of the American economic scene. Granted, 
Colander’s main contention with the editorial is one of biased scholarship, 
and not of school loyalties (both men are products of coastal, non-Chicago 
schools: Columbia and MIT). Yet, it is telling of a greater problem for the 
discipline when similarly schooled economists do not agree as to how the 
same historical facts add up. Or worse, what they entail for the future of 
the economy. The misreckoning this debate embodies anticipates the wor-
ries that I will discuss in this essay.
Modernism as Emancipation
Historians use heuristic labels to identify trends in the social and scientific 
milieu. Whether we call these handles epochs, paradigms, eras, periods, et 
cetera, the aim is to characterize the unique mentality or Zeitgeist that 
unites a common conception in the form of novelty and new ideas. With 
the advent of each new epoch we see dramatic shifts in attitudes and beliefs 
– iconoclastic transformations that affect the ways in which individuals 
perceive the world. Such paradigms do not merely characterize the way 
scholars speak to one another, but reveal deep structural shifts in the values 
and genesis of scientific theories.  
According to Hans Robert Jauss the term ‘modern’ – as a distinguishing 
mark of historical awareness – was first used in the fifth century. Appear-
ing as the Latin modernus, it depicted the present as officially Christian 
and distinct from the Roman and pagan past (Habermas & Ben-Habib, 
1981). Though some historians are careful to restrict ‘modernism’ to refer 
only to the seventeenth century Enlightenment, the phrase has appeared 
throughout history:
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With varying content, the term “modern” again and again expresses the 
consciousness of an epoch that relates itself to the past of antiquity, in 
order to view itself as the result of a transition from the old to the new. 
[...] the term “modern” appeared and reappeared exactly during those 
periods in Europe when the consciousness of a new epoch formed itself 
through a renewed relationship to the ancients – whenever, moreover, 
antiquity was considered a model to be recovered through some kind of 
imitation. (Habermas & Ben-Habib, 1981: 3)
According to Habermas and Ben-Habib, if we reflect on the structures 
of intellectual development, we see that in most fields – at critical periods 
in history – there arises a state of self-awareness by which the discipline 
(as experienced by the collective of its affiliates) becomes vexed: when the 
restrictive powers of tradition give rise to discontents, individuals inevitably 
challenge the doctrines and presuppositions which underlie their environ-
ment. The evolution of innovative ideas, then, occurs through a reactive 
and directed response against that milieu. Often the dominant views of the 
preceding epoch are subverted through deliberate and mutual exchange with 
adjoining fields  (for example, if we consider the historical developments 
in natural sciences, say, in physics, there appears to be an almost isometric 
relationship to the historical development of mathematics. It is no surprise 
then that Euclid, Archimedes, Galileo, and Newton – each of whom made 
ingenious contributions to physics – were foremost mathematicians). 
It follows that if the historical role of modern innovation results from 
a renunciation and substitution of the doctrines of the distant past, then 
we can express modernism as the reaction to classical antiquity: what has 
been previously termed ‘classicism’ can be identified by grandeur, self-
importance, and by bombastic religiousness and mythology: consider that 
the very root of classicism is class, i.e. ‘first class’, ‘social class’, ‘high class’. 
Thus, the grandioseness by which classical art, music, and education were 
celebrated is in fact dependent upon, or rather, set against a background of 
social and political stratification. 
By distinction, modern disciplines as we know them are interpreted as 
more functional, logical, and secular. In physics, mathematics, and natural 
philosophy, this has been characterized as a slimming down of explanatory 
foundations in favor of simple and parsimonious theories. The sciences in 
general have been motivated to discover (and/or engineer) proofs whose 
applications are wide-reaching and would lead to more accurate predictions. 
Similarly in art and architecture, modernism has replaced baroque and osten-
tatious designs with purposeful, simplified edifices. This largely emphasized 
the importance of concept as a mechanism guiding creation7. In modern 
art, explorations into the fundamentals of form, color and light abjure the 
traditional focus upon craftsmanship and realism which were traditionally 
measured by their ability to recreate and mimic the world, not challenge it. 
As Carl E. Schorske has eloquently portrayed it, the modernizing shift 
in Vienna (1860-1900) began as a prosocial retaliation against the upper 
crust of Viennese society. What germinated from citizen rebellion resulted 
in some of Europe’s chief cultural achievements in architecture, psychol-
ogy (notably psychoanalysis), fine art and music. In Fin-de-Siècle Vienna, 
he describes it as follows:
As early as the eighteenth century, the word “modern” acquired something 
of the ring of a war cry, but then only as an antithesis of “ancient” – 
implying contrast with classical antiquity. In the last one hundred years, 
however, “modern” has come to distinguish our perception of our lives 
and times from all that has gone before, from history as a whole, as 
such. Modern architecture, modern music, modern philosophy, modern 
science – all these define themselves not out of the past, indeed scarcely 
against the past, but in independence of the past. The modern mind 
has been growing indifferent to history because history, conceived as a 
continuous nourishing tradition, has become useless to it. (Schorske, 
1981: xvii)
Although we could discuss ad nauseam what modernism consists of 
relative to each of the aforementioned disciplines, this would be to miss 
the point. I am not concerned with the myriad ways in which the word 
‘modern’ has been invoked. Instead, what is common to each discipline we 
call modern is the deliberate (at times programmatic) self-extrication from 
the past. In this sense, modernization is emancipatory. Let it suffice then 
to characterize modernism as the cultural process of self-awareness; it is the 
procedure by which a common ideology comes to reevaluate and redefine 
its own essence by reflecting upon the very foundations from which it 
derives meaning. It is an act of intellectual liberation.
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Early Modernism to Logical Positivism: Philosophy’s 
Impact on Economics
Early modern philosophy has had a palpable role in the development 
of twentieth century ‘analytic’ and positivist philosophy. Although this 
much is evident from a cursory study of the history of philosophy, the 
impact of early modernism on later Samuelsonian economics is not alto-
gether obvious. An investigation into Descartes’ philosophical rationalism 
reveals how the epistemic foundations of natural science shifted from the 
empirical-qualitative structures of the former Aristotelian physics to that 
of mathematical reason. As Kurt Smith (2012) states:
The only properties of bodies with which the physicist can concern him or 
herself are size, shape, motion, position, and so on – those modifications 
that conceptually (or logically) entail extension in length, breadth, and 
depth. In contrast to Aristotle’s ‘qualities’, the properties (or modes) of 
bodies dealt with in Cartesian physics are measurable specifically on ratio 
scales (as opposed to intensive scales), and hence are subject in all the 
right ways to mathematics […] This conception of matter, conjoined 
with the sort of mathematics found in the Geometry, allies itself with 
the work of such Italian natural philosophers as Tartaglia, Ubaldo, 
and Galileo, and helps further the movement of early thinkers in their 
attempts to establish a mathematical physics. (my italics)
In his Meditations (1641/1996), Descartes engages in extreme skep-
ticism over the nature and reliability of knowledge gleaned from sense 
experience. This methodological doubt involved performing an epoché8 
upon the phenomenal world in order to establish clear and distinct ideas 
– that is, judgments which were presuppositionless and indubitable. The 
suspension of all judgments rooted in sense experience thus refuted the 
Aristotelian idea that natural ‘qualities’ were necessarily veridical, and 
furthermore refuted a very specific conception of God which was presup-
posed by Medieval theologians. Instead, the concept of God is rebuilt 
in his theory based on the indispensable and eternal (ontological) truths 
which, upon reflection, necessitate God’s existence (and furthermore sat-
isfy to prove its benevolence). This justifies that sense experience can be 
reliable – for we can trust that our sensations, as bestowed by a benevolent 
God, do not deceive us – and furthermore, that natural sciences can be 
preserved. However, what is crucial to this method of a priori reconstruc-
tion is the radicalization of the self – i.e. the cogito – as the epistemic basis 
of philosophical truth (1986).
As a prolegomenon, Descartes’ Discourse on Method and Meditations on 
First Philosophy served the intellectual community by providing a method 
of ahistorical/atemporal scientific analysis. And within the rationalist tra-
dition, Spinoza and Leibniz continued to develop philosophical axioms 
based on reflective, logico-deductive theories. However, modernism is 
not limited solely to the reflective a priori method. Empiricists, including 
John Locke and David Hume, employed similar reductive methods to sug-
gest an epistemology based on sense experience. And these developments 
further influenced Kant and the German Idealists, as well as the contem-
porary ‘analytic’ philosophers. 
However, in the early twentieth century modern philosophy culmi-
nated in the development of logical positivism, known metonymically as the 
Vienna Circle. Logical positivism required that philosophy be an extension 
of science and hence aim at eliminating any dubious metaphysical assump-
tions (and by consequence exalted the supposed transparency and tractability 
of mathematics). This emphasis on transparency required that philosophy 
impose linguistic frameworks whose axioms and statements correspond 
directly to the observable world: any claim that was not grounded in sense-
experience (i.e. could be empirically verified), or equally, was not conceived 
via a priori analytic statements, was determined to be meaningless. Yet, posi-
tivism was not exhausted by philosophy alone; the procedure of the scientific 
method (supplemented by a Lakatosian reduction of theory falsification9) was 
adopted by many disciplines as way of achieving “balance of continuity and 
progress” in scientific discovery (Balak 2006: 13-5). However, it is this osten-
sible10 notion of mathematical transparency which is most notably associated 
with Samuelsonianism. Marcel Boumans (2004: 14) states that: 
It is often assumed that mathematics is an efficient and transparent 
language. One of the most well-known supporters of this view was Paul 
Samuelson (1952). He considers mathematics to be a transparent mode 
of communication and that it is this transparency that will stop people 
[from] making the wrong deductive inferences. 
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In this regard, the positivists rejected Kant’s synthetic a priori judgment 
for its metaphysical baggage: Kant’s metaphysical realism/transcenden-
tal idealism was incongruent with the requirements of strict (empirical) 
verification (1787/1998). For this reason, it was Hume, not Kant, who 
was vindicated as an exemplary scientist whose skepticism and unyielding 
emphasis on scientific induction buttressed the positivist project. Thus, 
the scientism of the logical positivists had its greatest influence upon 
economists who were not satisfied with the traditionalist (classical) eco-
nomics (as espoused by Smith, Ricardo, and later Veblen and Marshall). 
But this already couches neoclassical economics in later stages of modern-
ism. We must see how, prior to Samuelson, economics developed out of 
the Scottish Enlightenment – predominantly due to Adam Smith, David 
Hume, and later John Stuart Mill. 
Political economy, as a subdiscipline of social and political philoso-
phy, embraced the presupposition that individuals are occupied solely 
with acquiring and consuming wealth and the subsequent activities that 
derive from this primary motive, such as production and distribution (Mill 
1884). In this regard, early economics was depicted as a hybrid induc-
tive-deductive method of inquiry which induced and then abstracted 
from all other human goals and motives (Keynes, 1904/1984). Herein, 
the aim of science was to investigate the laws that govern these opera-
tions, based on the supposition that man is a being who is determined, 
by the necessity of his nature, to prefer a greater portion of wealth rather 
than a smaller. In this way, Mill, among others, had conceived of politi-
cal economy primarily as a science of human behavior; one which assents 
to the general or universal principle that man is a wealth-maximizing 
creature. The subsequent forms of this general purpose (production and 
consumption) are ancillary to this fact. In this regard, political economy 
was developed as a science of abstracted generalizations about human 
behavior, much in the same way that geometry is a science of abstracted 
mathematical figures and their concomitant relationships. Though we 
may conceive of man as having motives other than consumption of 
wealth, or conversely, conceive of man as acting in a way that violates 
these principles, this no less invalidates the necessity of starting from a 
priori assumptions for their convenience and simplicity – or so political 
economists assumed. However, classical economics still maintained that 
careful induction ought to aid these generalized foundations, and in this 
regard, Keynes, Marshall, and the likes were still influenced greatly by 
the traditionalist approach to economic methodology.
It was not until the development of modern economics (following the 
conception of the macro-economy) that economists shifted toward the 
implementation of arcane, highly technical tools. With the introduction of 
business-cycle modelling and early econometrics (via Ragnar Frisch, Paul 
Samuelson, and Jan Tinbergen) the methodology of economics turned 
away from that of early political economy, thus embodying a more sys-
tematic approach toward the quantifying of production and consumption. 
‘These econometricians,’ write Marcel Boumans and John Davis (2010: 
31), ‘shared the scientific ideals of the logical positivists, having a deeply 
held belief in mathematical rigor and the empirical testing of theories.’ 
Though many of the general principles of modern economics were 
predicated upon the assumptions set forth by classical political econo-
mists, the modern era can be defined by its stern scientism – that is, 
the application of abstract models and impenetrable mathematics. As an 
intellectual discipline, contemporary economics represents the most for-
mal and dogmatic endeavor of modernity, which reached its apex during 
the dominance of logical positivism. Paul Samuelson and his successors 
including Lawrence Klein and Robert Solow were notably influenced 
by the positivist movement, and this explains the shift from political 
economy – as a science concerned with qualitative judgments – to neo-
classical or mainstream economics as it appears today. But we cannot 
place all the blame on Samuelson himself – for Frisch and Tinbergen 
also have a lasting effect on the introduction of statistical inference in 
econometrics. 
Yet, it is not merely positivism pure and simple that has caused such 
confusion for the discipline. The ‘methodological schizophrenia’ (to bor-
row Dan Hausman’s useful epithet) of Samuelsonianism is its precarious 
yet unrelenting commitment to instrumentalism – or, the ‘as-if ’ principle. 
Generally the instrumental view is regarded as the methodological posi-
tion that a theory, or rather, assumptions put forth by a theory, are justified 
just in case they are predictive. Thus, a theory need not explain why some 
cause produced an effect so long as the theory’s assumptions about the 
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concurrence of cause and effect are consistent enough to make useful pre-
dictions. And since economics has chiefly been interested in how humans 
behave, the focus on prediction (rather than true explanation) has had 
major appeal. 
The invocation of the ‘as-if ’ principle is most pronounced in the 
foundations of behavioral economics, game theory and decision theory, 
where human motivation can be represented by a set of modest assump-
tions. For instance, von Neumann-Morgenstern rationality supposes that 
persons are rational if and only if they seek to maximize the expected 
utility of each possible choice; in turn, all choices can be ranked accord-
ing to their ordinal utility. This internal ranking is revealed when the 
agent chooses, thus displaying their preference. The means by which these 
models represent ‘reality’ is not necessarily based upon genuine prefer-
ence formation which could be hindered by conflicting desires, imperfect 
information, or (irrational) expectations. Instead, the theory of expected 
utility merely assumes that persons act ‘as-if ’ they are calculating the 
relative values of all utility functions and then choose accordingly. As 
branches of micro-economics have developed, the precision with which 
such models have sought to capture the decision-making process have 
evolved by the manipulating parameters of whatever game or decision 
set agents are confronted with, or by introducing various caveat-terms 
for features like uncertainty, risk, and altruism. But, these models sup-
pose that humans act ‘as-if ’ they are rational, informed, and cognitively 
equipped to make complex calculations, and this has created a rather 
strange version of the starkly positive science postclassical economics pur-
ported (or at least pretended) to be. Consider the following remark made 
by Gary Becker (1976: 7):
The economic approach does not assume that decision units are 
necessarily conscious of their own efforts to maximize or can verbalize 
or otherwise describe in an informative way reasons for the systematic 
patterns in their behavior. Thus it is consistent with the emphasis on the 
subconscious in modern psychology.
While it is taken to be the case that persons are not actually the 
calculating machines that economists make them out to be, this quote 
nonetheless reveals what economists like Becker conceive economic 
agents to be: decision units – agents preprogrammed to satisfy rational-
choice assumptions. But, there is little consolation to be found in the 
‘as-if ’ methodology if the Samuelsonian takes it as fact that the ‘eco-
nomic approach’, the agent’s tendency toward maximization, is akin to 
a Freudian drive. 
Post-Positivist Philosophy: On the Importance of Language 
and Social Ontology
What we have learned from the last half-century in post-positivist (not 
to be confused with postmodern) philosophy was that the Vienna Circle 
and its scientism were hopelessly inflexible; their inexorable methods 
were too limited to capture the intricacies and nuances of human life 
(including the many social institutions which further influence how 
individuals conceive of the economy and hence their economic deci-
sions). I use the term ‘post-positivist’ to refer to multiple schools of 
thought, each of which privilege a unique methodology and set of moti-
vating principles. While these schools may differ on their respective 
approaches toward a new method of philosophizing, the characteristic 
commonality is the rejection of logical empiricism and the underlying 
assumption that an analytic-synthetic distinction is sufficient to carve 
the epistemic joints of science. Quine (1953) famously exposed the 
problems inherent to this distinction, arguing that the very founda-
tions of epistemic and metaphysical modality depend on extricating this 
dogma. A paradigm case of the post-positivist insurrection is Ludwig 
Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein was extolled by positivists for his publica-
tion of the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus which sought to expound the 
limits of the world through thought and language. However, despite its 
many merits, he subsequently revoked the conclusions he drew from 
the Tractatus, and moreover rejected the entire method espoused by 
the positivists. Wittgenstein re-evaluated the role that language played 
in common parlance, advancing (among other theories) that a word’s 
meaning is its use; that family resemblances – not essences – help to 
explain conceptual similarities; and most importantly, that the future of 
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philosophical investigation must abandon its fondness for rule-follow-
ing. Wittgenstein’s retraction of his earlier “dogmatic” sentiments and 
his austere criticism of rule-governed philosophical inquiry was defini-
tive of a new intellectual culture. 
Like Wittgenstein, philosophers ranging from Martin Heidegger to 
John Searle have investigated the very structures of reality which previously 
had been taken to be fundamental and obvious as the starting point in many 
social and scientific endeavors. This has been undertaken through a variety 
of philosophical methods, the majority of which have taken language and 
linguistic analysis to be of central importance. The hermeneutic approach 
of Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975), devised in the spirit of Heidegger’s meta-
ontology and further developed by Jürgen Habermas (1984, 1988), provided 
a conceptual scaffolding for conceiving of a linguistic based social-science, 
one which eschews the a priori assumptions of early modern philosophy as 
well as the strict empiricism of later positivists for an interpretive theory of 
communicative action. Though Habermas’ motivation to remain true to the 
spirit of the Enlightenment diverged from Gadamer’s more critical project, 
their joint influence within the field of philosophical hermeneutics conveyed 
an important insight: that a science of social beings needs to critically examine 
language and the linguistic commonalities of those beings. 
Albeit, while the hermeneutic approach of the later German philoso-
phers offered some reassurance that social sciences could be conceived of as 
more than an extension of the humanities (Habermas took care to distin-
guish his theory of communicative action from traditional conceptions of 
hermeneutic interpretation couched in the Geisteswissenschaften – or ‘human 
sciences’), there has, unfortunately, been little development in ‘harder’ social 
sciences that has taken the linguistic turn seriously. This notwithstanding, 
if we consider Descartes’ epoché and the subsequent movements in early-
modern philosophy to be indicative of a transcendental unrest – that is, a 
markedly new consideration for the conditions necessary for any empirical 
judgment – then many of the forthcoming post-positivist philosophies can 
be understood by their collective distrust of certainty.
The tragedy of modernism is that it takes itself too seriously – the 
demand for indubitable truth always presupposes some foundation or 
ideological backdrop upon which clear and distinct ideas can be deter-
mined. As later philosophers have pointed out, the Cartesian epoché 
wrongly presumed that the cogito – the self-knowing subject – was capable 
of performing cognitive and linguistic acts within a self-imposed, con-
ceptual vacuum. Descartes’ skepticism about the external world failed to 
doubt those very constructs that are necessary for a rich philosophical 
analysis – namely, a concept of language (or some kind of prelinguistic 
cognitive grammar), social and cultural affiliations, etc. If we grant that 
the later positivists were as steadfast in upholding the analytic-synthetic 
distinction as was Descartes concerning the epistemic validity of clear 
and distinct ideas, then it is easy to see how positivism fell out of fashion. 
Echoing this point, McCloskey (1983: 483) explains that ‘the program [of 
positivism] failed, and in the meantime probable argument languished. In 
Richard Rorty’s words, following Dewey, the search for the foundations 
of knowledge by Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, Russell, and Carnap was 
“the triumph of the quest for certainty over the quest for wisdom.”’ As a 
model for sound scientific practices, the program of positivism was misled 
by the pursuit of truth and epistemic certainty.
The ‘Post-Autistic’ Movement and the Critique of Samuel-
sonian Discourse
Along with McCloskey, Arjo Klamer and Steven Ziliak are two notable 
economists who have both expressed a great deal of criticism of the Sam-
uelsonian tradition. Their joint effort within the post-autistic movement 
reflects many of the same worries that post-positivist philosophers had 
regarding their self-assured predecessors. What has made mainstream 
economics metaphorically autistic is its introverted and egotistical 
approach toward scientific inquiry; economists have become indoctri-
nated to conceive of the economy through the rhetoric of quantification: 
regression coefficients, point elasticities, multiple correlation analyses, 
Phillips curves, equilibrium prices. The autist’s model consumer is not 
a human being, but Max U – a ‘sociopathic’ agent who seeks only to 
maximize expected utility (Klamer et al., 2007). Max U’s psychology can 
be determined by his set of utility functions and algorithmic decision 
models. 
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This conception of ‘the economy’ lacks the qualitative features that 
traditional political economists sought to preserve. We are then led to ask: 
is the ultra-formality of mainstream economics as scientific as it proclaims 
to be? If so, then this is hostile to the conception of science that many other 
scientists claim as their modus operandi. McCloskey (1999: 425) states that 
‘[economics], for all its promise, is in very bad shape because it has fallen 
into a cargo-cult version of science in which qualitative theorem-making 
runs the “theory” and statistical significance without a loss function runs 
the “empirical work”11.’ She continues:
Economics in its most prestigious and academically published versions 
engages in two activities, qualitative theorems without entries for the 
world’s data and statistical significance without loss functions. These two 
look like theorizing and observing, and have the same tough math and 
tough statistics that actual theorizing and actual observing would have. 
But neither of them is what it claims to be. Qualitative theorems are not 
theorizing in a sense that would have to do with a double-virtued inquiry 
into the world. In the same sense, statistical significance without a loss 
function is not observing. (1999: 426)
To put it in less abstract terms, the means by which economists per-
ceive the actual economy is through a hyperquantified lens of computation 
and simulation. All aspects of the phenomenal economy – the literal mar-
ket places populated with real flesh and blood agents – are codified into 
convenient representations. For all its rigor, it is not science (at least, not 
in the same sense that chemistry and physics are science). It is some kind 
of logic of economic theorizing based on a considerably small number 
of assumptions, but it is not the study of the economy in itself. In no 
way does the Samuelsonian conception of the economy resemble that with 
which the lay-person involves him/herself. This is especially perplexing if 
we consider that the economy depends for its existence upon the actions 
and engagements of individuals.   
While I do not disparage the richness and sophistication of the vari-
ous tools economists use, I am adamant that the discipline is beset by 
a rather indulgent self-image, which privileges its own rhetorical posi-
tion. The economy can be conceived of as more than a set of models 
and simulations; its composition depends just as much on the actions 
of non-economists as it does on its scientific analyses performed by 
properly trained statisticians. But the discourse is asymmetrical: there 
are the academics, who favor a certain set of periphrastic devices and 
topoi (e.g. equilibria, utility-maximization); and there are the lay-people, 
whose behavior, either knowingly or unknowingly, are constitutive of 
the economy. For the lay-person, the economy is not something that 
exists on a blackboard, but is a confluence of modes of being. These 
modes are the meanings that the word ‘economy’ evokes for them. These 
meanings range from ‘a digit on a paycheck’, or ‘an extra kilo of rice’, to 
‘percentage-point of interest’. When I say that discourse is asymmetrical, 
I mean that the language of economics does not consider these periph-
eral meanings with which the economy presents itself to non-academics. 
That is not to say that words like ‘digit’, ‘kilo’ or ‘percentage’ do not 
presume a modicum of mathematical understanding by non-economists; 
but instead, that the pervasiveness of the language of mathematics is 
no justification for reducing the discourse of economics to the limited 
rhetoric of quantification. 
Ontologically speaking, the discourse of non-economists is as integral 
to understanding the economy as is the academic economists’, whether this 
is via metaphor, institution, or equation. I am not making the bold state-
ment that the ontological status of the economy is exhausted by language 
and linguistic acts alone. But economists’ blatant disregard for the signifi-
cance of language and social idioms – in a word: the communicative actions 
that bestow meaning for individuals – is parasitic upon the broader concep-
tion of what economics is the study of. The cardinal sin that economists 
of the Samuelsonian tradition have committed is the confusion of math-
ematical discourse with ontological reality – while mathematics explains 
the economy, it is not constitutive of it. Consider the following passage from 
Klamer et al. (2007: 2):
Economics is a plurality of conversations, but with a few honorable 
exceptions today’s textbooks don’t deign to mention the fact. The actual 
economic conversation is heterogeneous. Yet the textbooks are startlingly 
homogeneous. The actual economic conversation is conducted 
by feminists and libertarians, empirical Marxists and postmodern 
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Keynesians, historical institutionalists and mathematical Samuelsonians. 
But most of today’s textbooks teach Samuelsonianism pure and simple, 
period. They are dogmatic, one voiced, unethical. 
But what does Klamer mean by ‘Economics is a plurality of conver-
sations’? ‘Postmodern Keynesians’ and ‘historical institutionalists’ hardly 
sounds like the manner of speaking that non-academics use to describe 
themselves, let alone how economics impacts their daily lives. So, what 
benefit is it to the study of the economy to consider these other academic 
conversations? The reason, I argue, is because it is precisely the scope 
and aim of alternative, heterodox schools to privilege diverse methods of 
discourse. While “empirical Marxists” and laissez-faire libertarians hold 
antithetical views toward one another, they satisfy to cover a broader range 
of possible modes of being, both of which lack proper representation in the 
neoclassical, Samuelsonian paradigm. While the conversation may sound 
equally as abstract between a mathematical Samuelsonian and empirical 
Marxist to the uninitiated, we must remember that it is not what the con-
versation ‘sounds like’ that is important for non-academics, but what the 
conversation is about. For this reason, neoclassical rhetoric is dangerous 
if it fails to consider that ‘decision units’ are more than ink on a page, or 
curves on a supply/demand graph. This is why academics who represent 
feminists, Marxists, libertarians, institutionalists, etc. must also have their 
place in the economics conversation. 
Other Considerations: Applied Philosophy of Science & 
Economics Imperialism 
My interest here has been to show that economics is not immune to the 
fluctuations of history, and that its methods can be traced to an era of 
overly confident scientism. However, some readers may be critical of the 
claims that I have made thus far either because they accuse me of portray-
ing a strawman of neoclassical economics by criticizing Samuelsonianism; 
or it may be asserted that I have not properly considered alternative devel-
opments in the field which do seek to supplement blackboard-theorizing 
with sociological and behavioral experiments. I would like address these 
issues:
First, it must be stated that many of the problems that philosophers of 
economics are concerned with have as their origin the complications and 
paradoxes found in the canon of philosophy of science. These challenges 
include, among other theoretical issues, the general problem of measure-
ment12, fact-value entanglement13, theories of sound evidence14, and a host 
of inquiries that invoke the use of higher-order linguistic frameworks and 
logical analyses. In the study of economics these armchair issues become 
palpable because they can be readily applied to concrete practices, where 
subjects can be surveyed (unlike the subjects of many biological sciences) 
and moreover consequences may be directly observable (unlike quantum 
physics and some branches of mathematics). 
We can examine, then, as demonstrative of the above challenges, the 
problem of quality change15 as it relates to the analysis of the standard costs 
of living. As has been previously investigated by Julian Reiss (2008), econ-
omists mistakenly validate the qualitative aspects of cost-of-living indices 
(COLI) by consulting and overdetermining consumer price indices (CPI). 
This is problematic given that CPI and COLI are categorically distinct 
metrics; the former describes the consumption of the average household 
and the latter refers to the price of a bundle of goods that an individ-
ual household is willing to pay for subsistence living. While there might 
be a conditionally dependent relationship between the two, it is unclear 
whether or to what degree one can be indicative of the other without pre-
supposing that the two are coextensive. While making use of a consumer 
price index for a cost-of-living analysis does not violate any laws of logic 
or natural science, it does require that economists presuppose much about 
the statistical relevance of the average costs of living, faithful census and 
data collection, and (most controversially) the robustness of utility and 
subjective well-being as suggestive of persons’ actual welfare. Not only is 
quality change plagued by the general problem of measurement, but it also 
implicates how macro-level phenomena can be precariously dependent 
on tenuous microfoundations. But how does an issue like quality change 
relate to the possibly committed strawman? 
Throughout this presentation I have (admittedly) not been clear in 
delineating wherein blackboard economics is most pervasive. That is, I 
have not made it explicit whether the matters of contemporary discourse 
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refer to microeconomic or macroeconomic theorizing. I respond to this 
charge by claiming that the sins of Samuelsonianism can be found in both 
camps. And it is much easier to see this by considering how (à la Haus-
man) the methodology is schizophrenic in the ways it draws inferences.
As stated above, quality change refers to a potential shift in living stan-
dards by imposing an interface between quantity measurement (CPI) and 
quality analysis (COLI). Though COLI is a quantitative measurement, 
i.e. it refers to the cost of a particular size of a bundle of goods, the experi-
ence of that bundle and the subsequent interpretation of that experience is 
qualitative. But, economists do not like to work with subjective properties 
and thus COLI serves as a tractable marker for explaining what persons 
prefer. The difficulty arises when individual preferences over consumption 
bundles are extrapolated (based on the deductive assumptions about the 
rational behavior of individuals) and this representative household is then 
aggregated over a large number of supposedly similar households. The 
indexation of costs-of-living is thus an inductive appraisal of the average 
consumption amount based on an essentially deductive preference model. 
So, what is at stake here? On the one hand, COLI is predicated on 
utility – as a de facto measurement of subjective well-being – to justify 
household consumption levels. Under the umbrella of neoclassical micro-
economics, expected utility theory is regarded as highly athletic: ‘as-if ’ 
maximization is justified on the pragmatic assumption that given the cor-
rect parameters and modest set of behavioral assumptions, any agent can 
be shown to maximize some form of utility, whether evinced as wealth, 
social preference, happiness, etc. On the other hand, when economists 
inductively derive the expenditure of an average household on consump-
tive bundles, this is a macro-level assessment. Thus, if CPI tracks changes 
in the price of a specific bundle of goods over time, then the fluctuations 
of price indices are assumed to be determined by the willingness of per-
sons to spend X amount on the bundle of goods at that time. Note, I am 
not claiming that quality change is an instance of methodological indi-
vidualism (however, this remains a hot-button issue in the methodology 
of economics). But, it is the case that quality change exposes precisely how 
economists indoctrinated by blackboard tactics will employ both induc-
tive and deductive methods of analysis as it suits their needs: and this 
shows how the discourse at both levels continues to implement idealistic 
assumptions about the veracity of revealed preferences (as deductive choice 
methods) and accuracy of statistical analyses (based on simulations and 
inductive inferences from sample sets). 
The other consideration I anticipate is that perhaps Samuelsonianism 
is not representative of the most cutting edge, experimental branches of 
economics. It would thus be unfair to level this criticism against behav-
ioral studies that deal directly with cognitive and neurological studies, ones 
which could have unparalleled influence on the trajectory of future eco-
nomics. In response to this claim, I present two cases from the burgeoning 
field of neuroeconomics.
Recent work in the field of neuroeconomics has generated some con-
troversy regarding the role that certain economic concepts play in actual 
decision-making processes. This has caused many to re-evaluate whether 
economics can learn from cognitive and neurological studies of the brain; 
or conversely whether it is neuroscience which ought to adopt the explana-
tory mechanisms of economic theory to make sense of the data. The first 
interpretation is referred to as the ‘neuroeconomics critique’; the latter has 
been dubbed ‘economics imperialism’. Both of the following cases I pres-
ent are guilty of the latter. 
In the first case, Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesedorfer (2005) rebuke 
recent evidence16 whereby neuroscientists sought to map brain states in 
order to ‘track’ the presence of utility in subjects. In response to the rather 
novel findings – that utility is a plurality of brain states which are contin-
gent on the type of satisfaction an agent experiences – Gul and Pesendorfer 
argue against the commitment that facts and concepts about human 
behavior (such as utility maximization or risk aversion) hold unequivo-
cally across disciplines. This means that, against the evidence that utility 
is not a single, ‘one-size-fits-all’ metric of satisfaction, economics need not 
reconsider that there are multiple ways of realizing expected utility. They 
maintain that, though psychologists have certain intuitions about human 
behavior and specialized methods for mapping these intuitions, it does 
not follow that these intuitions supervene on the principles of economic 
theory. More likely is the case that psychological explanations of brain 
activity are built upon very different notions of ‘preference satisfaction’ 
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or ‘risk aversion’ – that is to say, that their concepts of utility or risk may 
be fundamentally different from that of economics. Thus, rather than to 
admit that utility is a much more nuanced and complex thing, Gul and 
Pesendorfer are adamant that cognitive scientists and psychologists have a 
different understanding and hence use for the scientific data that supports 
a multitude of uses for the term ‘utility’. In short, Gul and Pesendorfer 
maintain that the neuroeconomics critique (that economics can learn from 
neuroscience) is false.
The second neuroeconomics case comes from the decision-theoretic 
experiments of Paul Glimcher et al. (2005). Specifically, their experiments 
sought to map encoded neurons to determine the preference-profiles of 
subjects. Glimcher et al concluded that the brain in fact operationalizes 
an expected utility calculation analogous to that of rational choice theory 
– they refer to this as physiological expected utility. The upshot of their 
discovery is that actual decisions should be tractable in the neural architec-
ture of subjects making both descriptive and prescriptive aims of expected 
utility theory realizable. Glimcher’s avowed motivation was to capture the 
subjective expectations that agents have when faced with decisions – this 
motivation is attributed principally to Bernoulli (1738/1954) and Savage 
(1954). The importance of Bernoulli’s model (for physiological expected 
utility to have potential merit) expressed that two variables from the exter-
nal world were modified by processes internal to the decision maker and 
that the product of these computations was then represented and used to 
make choices. Yet, they concede that despite the ‘significant uncertainty’ 
about the precise form of Bernoulli’s stated internal computation, cur-
rent neurobiological evidence seems to strongly support this early claim, 
namely that expected utility is computed through an internal mechanism. 
For this reason, economic theory is better suited to explain the neural fir-
ings in the brains of subjects faced with decision problems. Again, this is 
an instance of economics imposing theory on external disciplines, not vice 
versa. 
Both of the cases above constitute what has been called economics 
imperialism. While the very term is a debated one, I regard the examples 
as telling of a mentality that stems from the same history which birthed 
Samuelsonianism. While Glimcher’s experiments are less volatile to the 
mutual exchange of ideas among disparate fields, Gul & Pesedorfer rep-
resent a commitment to the purity of economic theory – that economics 
is equipped with the tools it needs to explain human behavior. What 
is gathered from neurological studies is ancillary, and at best, supple-
mentary to the assumptions held by neoclassical economists. It thus 
represents a part of the discipline which is unyielding to the spirit of 
scientific enquiry.
Concluding Remarks
It has been my goal to show that the ‘blackboard’ mentality of neoclassi-
cal economics is excessively quantitative and thus too rigid to investigate 
fully the structures of the economy. However, we must realize that the 
intransigent personality of neoclassicism has its roots in pre-Samuel-
sonian positivist philosophy. Logical positivism and early-twentieth 
century ‘analytic’ philosophy had by Samuelson’s heyday already evolved 
from an early-modern, post-Enlightenment Cartesianism, which pur-
sued certainty to the exclusion of practical wisdom. Descartes’ concept 
of clear and distinct ideas underscores what is meant to be emancipatory 
about modernism: that a logical and secularly-reasoned approach toward 
science should liberate truth from pernicious and unwarranted dogma. 
It is for this reason that mathematics, as a tractable and transparent lan-
guage, has been the primary mode of economic theorizing over the last 
century. The irony, however, is that these very methods have held eco-
nomics captive and prevented it from developing further. While natural 
sciences such as physics and chemistry can afford to be, and by virtue of 
their content ought to be positive, economics is an entirely different kind 
of science. ‘Blackboard’ economics functions as if mathematical entities 
are the sole contents of the discipline, and for this reason invoke positiv-
ist methods. But this is mistaken. If Popper is correct, and mathematical 
objects are merely ‘quasi-matter’, then these objects are only a means 
by which the actual subject of economics is expressed. In the spirit of 
traditional political economy, then, it is fundamentally a discipline of 
human action. And as humans – not Beckerian decision units – we are 
imbedded in an amalgam of social institutions that include language and 
linguistic commonalities, social dispositions, imperfect knowledge and 
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idiosyncratic behavior. For these reasons, the analytic tools handed down 
from modernism have not been emancipatory for economics; instead, 
they have imposed an exceedingly restrictive scientific regime which 
undervalues these institutions. 
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Notes
1. This remark was made ‘off the cuff’ during a plenary discussion for the INEM panel 
members.
2. I use the term ‘paradigm’ very loosely here. I am fully aware of its significance in the 
history and philosophy of science. In this paper I refrain from directly referencing Kuhn 
(1970) to avoid any confusion that may ensue from his specific use of paradigm shift in 
scientific revolution.
3. This is not meant to diminish or ignore the integral role that early economists had on 
the development of a separate, more quantified science of the economy. This list inclu-
des, among many others, the work of Alfred Marshall, William Stanley Jevons, Thorstein 
Veblen, Carl Menger, Vilfredo Pareto, to name a few. However, my aim in this paper is not 
to offer a historical analysis as such; it is to look at specific parts of the history of economics, 
parts which have caused the discipline to propel itself in an unambiguous direction.
4. Whether we conceive of (the aim) of science from the perspective of Kuhn, Popper, 
Lakatos, or other, the generalized argument that positive science ought to be value-free is 
of significant importance concerning the normative implications of economics. Friedman 
(1966) famously discusses the possibility of positive economics, which has since incurred 
numerous publications in response. Recently, the case for positive economics has spurred 
debates related scientific realism (Mäki, 2009; Reiss, 2012) and fact-theory-value entang-
lement (Dasgupta 2005, 2007; Putnam & Walsh 2007, 2009). Though, the literature on 
realism vs. instrumentalism is a vast and decades old debate.
5. While a priori truths are ideal, not all idealizations are a priori true.
6. In the article, ‘freshwater’ is used to denote Chicago-style economics whereas ‘saltwater’ 
refers to more coastal programs. This geographical metaphor is not a strict or even com-
monly regarded distinction – rather it is a convenient explanatory heuristic for Krugman’s 
presentation of the rift among styles of economic training.
7. See Carl E. Schorske (1981) for further discussion regarding the effects of moderniza-
tion.
8. Although the epoché is principally associated with Edmund Husserl regarding his 
method of phenomenological reduction (i.e. the ‘bracketing’ of biases which affect one’s 
experience of the phenomenal world), the term in fact has a historical basis in ancient 
Greek philosophy, as employed by the Skeptics (Brittain, 2008). Although I do not attri-
bute to Descartes Husserl’s specific method of phenomenological reduction, the epoché 
satisfies to capture the institution of hyperbolic doubt with regard to sense-experience.
9. However, as Imre Lakatos’ mentor, Karl Popper (1959) was an adamant critic of posi-
tivism – namely of the principle of verification – due to what he saw as the unanswerable 
problem of induction (Okasha 2002).
10. Boumans also notes that Popper regarded mathematical objects as ‘quasi-matter’ and 
therefore not always transparent. He states, ‘This is shown by the fact that formalisms can 
be interpreted in different ways’ (Boumans 2004: 14).
11. McCloskey makes reference to the ‘loss-function’ as it relates to statistical significance. 
For the non-economist, a loss-function can be understood most simply as an ‘estimator’ 
applied to a statistical model which is intended to map, that is anticipate, the actual loss 
experienced in the context of a particular applied problem. In The Loss Function Has Been 
Mislaid: The Rhetoric of the Significance Tests, McCloskey argues that misuse of statisti-
cal significance in a majority of economics publications can be attributed to this missing 
element. She quotes Abraham Wald, stating: ‘The question as to how the form of the [loss 
function] should be determined, is not a mathematical or statistical one. The statistician 
who wants to test certain hypotheses must first determine the relative importance of all 
possible errors, which would entirely depend on the special purpose of his investigation’ (as 
cited in McCloskey, 1985: 203).
12. In principle, this is an epistemic issue: On the one horn, economists seek to define a 
veridical instrument of measurement; on the other horn, without preconceived instru-
mentation, they cannot study the variables in question. This would imply that certain 
preconditions – i.e. conceptual frameworks, axiomatic truths – must be met in order to 
embark on scientific inquiry at all. Thus, the general problem of measurement is one of 
circularity.
13. Aforementioned in the introductory section. For further information, see Hilary Put-
nam (1989).
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14. For classic discussions on the nature of scientific evidence, see Carl Hempel (1945, 
1958, 1962), Nelson Goodman (1983), and Wesley Salmon (1984).
15. The problem of quality-change refers to the variation in quantity or price of a bundle of 
goods which causes a disproportionate change in the subjective experience of that bundle. 
Because CPI measures price changes in relation to their effect on the cost-of-living index, 
they are conflated with qualitative judgments, namely utility measurement. This means 
that price changes incur a curious evaluation, or rather translation, into functional utility. 
See Reiss (2008).
16. This issue concerns the use of neuroeconomic evidence in favor of supporting changes 
to normative economic methodology. The issue, as it is presented in The Case for Mindless 
Economics, involves an analysis of and rejection to what is called the ‘neuroeconomics 
critique’, which states that data from neuroscience can be insightful for understanding 
economic behavior. The neuroeconomics critique supposes that brain sciences are in a 
privileged position to experiment with individuals in artificially constructed economic 
situations, and this evidence may change the way that economists interpret game- and 
decision-theoretic models. See Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec (2004, 2005) for more 
discussion.
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